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ABSTRACT
Thispaper analyzes the effects of monetary and fiscal policy shocks on
the term structure of interest rates. The effects of temporary versus
permanent, unanticipated versus anticipated, policy disturbances and the
responses of long versus short, and real versus nominal, rates are
contrasted. The main results are summarized in a series of propositions.
Among them, the finding that an unanticipated permanent fiscal expansion
impacts more on long-term rates, may help explain their observed excessive
volatility. The effects of structural changes on the relative variances are
also discussed, with the effect which operates through the impact on private





Seattle, WA 98195I. INTRODUCTION
The term structure of interest rates is an important mechanism for the transmission of macroeconomic
policy. Monetarypolicyconducted through the transaction of short—term assets has effects, via the term
structure, on tong—term interest rates, which in turn influence the rate of investment and the growth rate
of the economy. Yet to date, there has been relatively little attention devoted to analyzing the effects of
macroeconomic policy on the term structure. Exceptions to this include Blanchard (1981), Mascaro and
Meltzer (1983), Thrnovsky and Miller (1984) and McCafferty (1986), although these modets are restrictive
in various ways.'
The past 30 years or so has seen substantial twists in the yield curve. For example, during the latter
half of the 1950's the yietd spread on 10 year U.S. 'fteasury bonds over 3 month Bills averaged around .7
percentage points. It increased during the first half of the 1960's to around 1.2, dropping off during the
second half of the decade to under .3. During the middle and latter parts of the 1970's it increased to
1.6 and after becoming negative at the end of the decade, it has averaged around 2.5 during the economic
expansion of the 1980's.
There is an extensive literature investigating the empirical relationships between short—term and long—
term interest rates? The starting point for these studies is typically some version of the capital asset pricing—
efficient markets relationship, which expresses the current tong—term rate as a discounted sum of the expected
future short—term rates, over the time to maturity. Certain aspects of this relationship have been investigated
in detail and shown to be somewhat at variance with the underlying theory. In a seminal paper, Shiller
(1979) has shown how empirical estimates of the volatility of the long—term interest rate, as measured by the
variance of its short—term holding yields, vastly exceeds that implied by the underlying theory. This finding
has generated considerable interest and stimulated further work by Singleton (1980, Flavin (1983), Kleidon
(1986) and others, on the variance bound test used by Shiller. Thee results have been viewed as casting
serious doubt on the expectations approach to the term structure.
By focusing on only a single structural relationship between the short—term and long—term rates,the
framework adopted by the empirical literature is a strictly partial equilibrium one. In fact, both short—term
and long—term rats are jointly determined as part of a complete macroeconomic system. As such, their
stochastic properties reflect the stochastic processes determining policy and other exogenous disturbances
impinging on the economy. The purpose of this paper is to examine the behavior of the term structure
within such a macroeconomic framework, under the assumption that agents hold rational expectations.
Using this approach, the solutions for the current long-term and short-term interest rates areobtained in
terms of current and expected future government policy instruments, which we take to be monetaryand
1fiscal policies. We then analyze the effects on the term structure of various policycbanges.In particular,
we contrast the effects of (i) temporary versus permanent policy changes; and (ii) unanticipated venus
anticipated changes; and the effects on (iii) long versus short rates; and (iv) real versus nominal rates.
This macroeconomic general equilibrium approach to the term structure offers severalimportantinsights.
First, it is clear that the term structure is sensitive to different types of policy (and other disturbances).
Indeed, these are presumably what are being reflected in the types of twists in the yield curve which we
noted. This equilibrium approach enables us to address this issue in a rather general way. Secondly, it also
provides a useful framework which may aid in our understanding of the empirical results obtained. In this
respect, we will show below that the small variance of the long rate relative to the short rate, which has
formed the basis for much criticism of the expectations approach to the term structure, holds for only some,
but not all, disturbances. For example, if the underlying disturbances in the economy are transitory shocks
in the money supply, then indeed the ratio of the variances of the long—term to the short—term interest
rates, implied by the model, will be unrealistically small. On the other hand, if the underlying shocks are
permanent disturbances in fiscal policy, then the variance of the long rate in fact typically exceeds that of
the short rate. lb the extent that stochastic disturbances in fiscal policy have been the dominant sources
of interest rate fluctuations and can be approximated by such a proc, this can indeed help explain the
apparent excess volatility of long—term rates characteristic of the empirical literature.
A further important consequence of a complete macroeconomic approach is that we are able to establish
how, with risk averse speculators, an increase in the variance of government policy gives rise to two effects
on the variances of the interest rates. First there is a direct effect; given the parameters of the model, a
larger variance in policy will translate to a larger variance in the rates. Secondly, by influencing private
speculative behavior, it also has another indirect effect. This may either reinforce or counteract the direct
effect, depending upon the nature of the disturbance.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next two sections outline the model and its solution.
Sections 4and5 then analyze the effects of various kids of monetary and fiscal disturbances, respectively,
on the term structure, while Section 6discussesthe implication of these for the observed relative variances of
short and long rates. Section 7thenbriefly analyzes the impact of structural changes on the term structure,
while the final section highlights the main conclusions.
2. COMPLETE STOCHASTIC MACRO MODEL WITH TERM STRUCTURE
The model we shall use is a conventional stochastic new classical macro model. It consists of the








= real output, measured in logarithms,
B, = long—term real interestrate, measuredin natural units,
1, = short—term nominal interest rate, measured in natural units,
r1 = short—termrealinterest rate, measured in natural units,
G, = real government expenditure, measured in logarithms,
= price of output, measured in logarithms,
= expectation of Pfortime t + i,formedat time 2,1 = 1,...; aU 2,
= nominal supply of money, measured in logarithms.
Equation (la) is the IScurve,where the relevant interest rate is taken to be the long—term real rate. This
reflects the fact that real expenditures include investment, which given adjustment costs depend upon the
long—term real rate.3 Money market equilibrium is described by (ib), where the demand for money depends
upon the short—term nominal rate. The third equation describes the supply of output in terms of a Lucas
supply function; i.e., output (as a deviation about its natural rate level) depends upon the unanticipated
change in the current price level. This formulation abstracts from persistence in output, but since this issue
is not the focus of our analysis, the simple supply function (ic) suffices for our purposes.
The critical part of the model involves the relationships between the interest rates. The first of these,
(id) is the standard relationship between the short—term real and nominal interest rates.4 The relationship
involving the term structure is specified by (is), where the long—term real rate ol interest is defined to be
the yield on a consol paying a constant (real) coupon flow of unity. If we denote such a yield by R,theprice
3of the consol is .Therelationship (le) can be obtained as a linear approximation to a simple capital asset
pricing relationship.
An important aspect of this relationship is the parameter r. On the assumption of risk neutrality, ry =A,
whereR is the mean long—term real rate. This is the form adopted in the empirical literature. On the other
hand, a relationship such as (le) with q constant, can also be obtained in the more general framework of a
two—period mean—variance utility maximizing framework with risk averse speculators. In this case, ,canbe
shown to be of the form
where the constant It reflects the degree of risk aversion and 4(1) is the one period variance of the long—
term rate.5 In this case, as long as investors are risk averse, It> 0, and q increases with the variance 4(1).
It can therefore be interpreted as being the "risk adjusted discount rate" and is endogenously determined
along with 4(1). As long as the underlyingstochastic economicstructure remains unchanged, so that 4(1)
remains constant, then q can also be treated as constant. This will be the assumption maintained throughout
Sections 3-5. In Section 6, however, we will consider the effects of changes in thestructure, whichinvolve
considering their impact on 4(1) and hence on
One further point worth noting is that the portfolio choice has been decomposed into a money demand
function and the asset pricing relationship, with the latter depending upon the one—period variance of the
long term real rate and k through 'i• In general, the coefficients of the money demand function, derived as
part of this optimization will also depend upon these same parameters. The decomposition we have adopted
may be shown to arise in theimportantcase where the underlying two—period utility function is separable in
consumption and current real money balances, on the one hand, and future wealth, on the other. The money
demand function (ib), which is independent of 4(1) can be derived as an approximation to the optimality
conditions derived from this form of utility function; see Eaton and Thrnovsky (1981).
The complete macro modelconsistingof equations (la) —(le)jointly determines the five variables
'1,R,•iand P. In addition, there is a relationship between the short—term and long—term nominal
rates. While the latter does not appear explicitly in any of the behavioral relationships, it is nevertheless
of some interest and is discussed below. To preserve simplicity, we assume that the only long—term bond is
real. Under this condition we can then show that to a linear approximation the short—term and long—term
nominal rates are given by
it= — '('6u — l) (2)
4where 7= equilibriumof the long—term nominal rate, and I =R=. Theassumption being made that the
long—term bonds are real, while appearing restrictive, is not unreasonable. They can simply be viewed as
beingequities issued by firms tofinance their investment.
This modelpossessestheusual long—runneutrality properties. The steady state (denoted by ban)





Inthe long run, all interest rates are equal and depend only on the level of government expenditure. The
price level, in addition to depending upon the level of government expenditure, is proportional to the stock
of money.
3. SOLUTION TO THE MODEL
To solve the model, we proceed by first determining expectations and then substituting the resulting
expressions back into the system. Taking expectations of the supply and aggregate demand functions at
time t, for time t + j,yields:
Y45,1=O 1=1,2,... (4a)
D*—" '46 "l+j,t — t7t+j,t/ .
Giventhe Lucas supply function, output for any period in the future is expected to be zero, while the expected
long—term real rate for time t + jdependsupon only the expected level of real government expenditure for
that period. Next, the expectations of the term structure relationship (le) implies
=C+,1 — {R÷1,1 —
which,using (4b) becomes
=(1+ !)G4.1 —)_G+j+ig. (4c)
5An expected transitory increasein governmentexpenditurefor time 2 + j isseento havea larger effect
on the expected short—term rate for that period, than it does on the long. The reason is that it lowers the
expectedpriceof the long— term assetforthat period,therebyincreasing the expected capital gain on holding
that asset, and raising the expected short—term rate above the long rate. By contrast, an expected increase
in government expenditure for the following period 2+j + 1, lowers rj4.1. The reason is that it lowers the
expected price of the long—term asset for the following period, thereby lowering the expected capital gain
on holding that asset, and reducing the expected short—term rate of return. Combining these two effects,
an increase in government expenditure which is expected to be sustained for (at least) two period raises the
expected price of the long term bond equally for the two periods. The expected capital gain is eliminated
and the expected response of the short—term rate equals that of the long rate.
Substituting (4a), (4c) into the money market equilibrium condition (Ib) and taking expected values,
yields the following difference equation in the expected price level:
°2Z.j+1,i—(1 + a,)P41,1 = —M;+,, —
= M"11 — 9{(1 + —
thestable solution to whicb is
00
1 • 2 a
:tt÷:t:l: — 1 + 02 s+j+541 +)+7(+ (6)
+ (02—')t1+a+et(i21.
Settingj= 1in this equation, the expected price level is the discounted sum of all expected future money
supplies and expected future short—term real interest rates. An increase in expected government expenditure
for just one period ahead, G+, raises the expected short—term real interest rate for period one and this
increases the expected price for that period. Expected increases in government expenditure for subsequent
periods have two effects. For example, an increase in G+2. say, raises r+21, while lowering r÷11; see (4c).
The net effect on P4u depends upon the quantity (a2v —1).Recognizing that 03isthe semi-elasticity
of the demand for money, 03fl is tht•interest elasticity of the demand for money, when the interest rate
equals the risk adjusted discount rateAssuming03Q <1as being the plausible case, we see that expected
increases in government expenditure for subsequent periods will lower the first period's expected price level.
To obtain the solutions of or the current variables of the model, we take the one period expectations of
equations (la)- -(le), (4) and (5) and subtract from the original equations. Eliminating the nominal interest
6rate i1, this system, written in terms of unanticipated current changes, can be expressed in terms of the
following matrix equation:
Id 0 0 a 0 —01+02 o i+ —1 0
—10 0 Pc—Ptl
C1 -
— MZ1_1+ 02(Pg•4.j,g —
- +i,-) (7)
0
Given the expressions for expectations in (4b), (4c), and (6), this system may be solved for the current
equilibrium of the economy, in terms of the policy variables G, M1 and their expectations. But the solutions
are also obtained in terms of q, which, if speculators are risk averse, is pcsitively related to the one—period
valiance of the real long rate, 4(1), and therefore is itself endogenous to the systemS As long as the structure
of the economy is fixed, this can be treated as a given parameter. However, any structural change, resulting
from the change in some parameter, will lead to a change in 4(1) and in q, and this needs to be taken into
account.Examples ofchanges in the degree of risk aversion and in the variances of exogenous policy changes
are discussedinSection 7 below.Weshall restrict ourcommentsto the solutions for the interest rates, and
discuss boththe realand nominal in turn.
A. Real Rates
Solving (7) for the unanticipated change in the current long—term real rate, yields








Accordingto (8), the unanticipated change in the long—term rate depends upon: (i) the unanticipated change
in current government expenditure; (ii) the unanticipated change in the current money stock; (iii) therevision
to the forecast of the price level for time t + 1, updated between time t —Iand t; (iv) the revision to the
forecast of the next period's long—term real rate, updated between time t —1and t.
From(6),the revision to theforecastof the price level is
7— =l+2{t0(M6*+1,1 —M;++1 1+
)h
(9)





Substitutingexpressions into (8) yields the solution for the long term real rate. The resulting expression is
reported in equations (Ia) of Table 1.
The unanticipated change in the long—term real rate depends positively upon the current unanticipated
change in government expenditure ad negatively upon the unanticipated change in the current money
supply. These first two effects are standard. In addition, it depends inversely upon revisions to forecasts of
all future money stocks. This comes from the fact that an upward revision to the forecast of the money stock
for time +jsayleads to an upward revision to the forecast price level for time 1+1, (P41 — This
leads to a partial upward adjustment in the short—term nominal rate and a corresponding partial reduction
in the corresponding real rate. The long rate, being an average of future short—term rates, is therefore also
reduced. Finally, the adjustment in the long—term real rate depends positively or negatively upon revisions
to nil future forecasts of government expenditure, depending upon whether the elasticity of the demand for
money 21 1. The mechanism for this again is through the revision to the price forecast. We may note
that these (and all other solutions) are of the general form considered by Plosser (1982).
The response of the short—term real rate is obtained from the term structure relationship, which we may
write as
— = (1+ !)(R. —R,,-i.) — 1(C+1. — R÷1,_1). (10)
The first component of this is a proportional magnification of the unanticipated component of the long—term
real rate. But in addition, the upward revision to the prediction R.,.impliesa reduction in the expected
price of the long—term bond. This lowers the real rate of return, thereby lowering the short—term real interest
rate. The resulting expression for the adjustment of the short—term real rate, expressed in terms of the policy
variables, is given in equations (ii) of Table 1.
B. Nominal Rates
8From the short—termreal rate, the short—term nominal rate can be easily determined. Taking one—period
expectations of (ld) and subtractingyields
— i;,_ = (ri — r11_1)+ (P41,1— P41,11)—(P—Z,—1)• (11)
The expressions for (rg—rS_l),(P41l
—
P'1,1._1)areobtainedfrom (iia)of Table 1, and equation (9),
respectively. The remaining quantity, the unanticipated change in the current price level, '—t—i. obtained
by sotving (7), is given by the expression
P1— = ÷ !)(G,—G,1_1)+ d(M1 —M1_1)+ a2d(P41, —
(12)
—
Combining these components yields the solution for the unanticipated change in the current short—term
nominalrate, i— in terms of the actual and anticipated future policy variables. This is reported in
(uia) ofThble 1.
Theexpected short—termnominalrate is obtained bytakingconditional expectations ofthemoney
marketequilibrium condition (ib). Noting (4a), this is givenby
= —[P4,,
— 3 = 1,2,.-. (13)
so that the expected future short—term nominal rate is inversely related to the expected future real money
stock for that period. The solution for the one-period ahead expected future nominal rate is obtained by
substituting (6) into (13), and setting 3 = 1. This is reported in (iiib). In contrast to the expected future
real rates, it depends upon the discounted sum of all expected future policy variables. This occurs because
of their impact on the expected inflation rate.
Finall the long—term nominal interest rate is obtained from the term structure relationship (2), the
solution to which (with I=fl) is
= 1+l/R+Ei;+J,(lRY]
=
The relevant expressions are obtained from (13), (6), with solutions being reported in (in), (ivb) of Table 1.
94. IMPACT OF MONETARY DISTURBANCES ON TERM STRUCTURE
Table2 summarizes the effects ofmonetary and fiscalpolicy disturbances on the various interest rates.
These effects are determined on the assumption that the parameter 'i remains fixed, so that they are to be
interpreted as pertaining to a given structure of the economy. The shock being analyzed must therefore be
viewed as coming from a given probability distribution, rather than reflecting any change in the variance.
Both transitory and permanent disturbances are considered. The policy variable Zg say (Z, = A1, G1), is
described by the stochastic process
(14)
The random variables cf eT have zero means, finite variances o, 4 respectively, and are independently
distributed over time. Under these conditions cf represents a permanent shift while cT represents a transitory
shock. To ensure that q remains constant across disturbances, we shall assume that uj, +4 remains constant.
Table 2 draws the following distinctions between the responses of the various interest rates:
(i) real vs. nominal rates;
(ii) long vs. short rates.
The disturbances are characterized as follows:
(i) transitory vs. permanent disturbances;5
(ii) unanticipated vs. anticipated current disturbances; i.e., whether or not the stochastic components
eTcf. are anticipated in advance.
To discuss the effects of the policy shocks it is convenient to decompose the various interest rate! z
into their unanticipated component (z1 —z,) and their anticipated component z. Any unanticipated
policy shock has no effect on and so the response of the actual interest rate is simply that of(z1 —z,1_1).
Analogously, any anticipated policy shock has no effect on (z — z,,_) and so the complete response of the
interest rate is fully reflected in 4Il In describing the behavior of the interest rates in response to the
various shocks we will therefore in fact be referring to the appropriate components reported in Table 2.
The effects of various monetary disturbances, which are summarized in Part A of Table 2, are discussed
in the remainder of this section. Fiscal disturbances are reported in Part B and are considered in Section 5
below. In all cases, the disturbances are taken to be of unit magnitude. One expression which occurs both
10explicitly in Part A of Table 2 and playsarotein subsequentcomparisons we shall make is (1 + l/q —do1).
We shall assume that
>0 (15)
a condition which is surely met for all plausible parameter values.9
A. UnanticipatedMonetaryDisturbances
We begin with a consideration of unanticipated monetary disturbances and from Part A of Table 2,
draw the following observations:
1. An unanticipatedtemporaryor permanent increase in the nominal money supply will lowerboththe
short—term and long—term real interest rates, with the effects on the former being proportionately greater
by a factor (1 + 1/ip) in the two cases.
2. An unanticipated temporary or pennanent increase in the nominal nxney supply will lower both the
short—term and Ion g—tenn nominal interest rates, with the effects on the former being proportionately
greater by a factor (I + 1/.) in the two cases.
3. An unanticipatedtemporarymonetary expansion leads to a grater reduction in short—term nominal
than in short—tarn real rates. The same is true with respect to long—term rates, when speculators are
risk neutral, but is not necessarily so when they are risk averse.10 An unanticipated pennanentmonetary
expansion causes a greater reduction in real than it does in nominal interest rates (both long-term and
short—term).
4. An unanticipated temporary monetary expansion leads to a greater reduction in nominal interest rates
(both long—term and short—term), but a smaller reduction in real interest rates (both long—term and
short—term), than does an equivalent pennanent monetary expansion.
Many of these effects are straightforward. The proportionality in the effects of monetary expansions on
the short—term and long—term rates follows directly from the term structure relationship. The fact that a
temporary monetary expansion has a greater effect on short—term nominal rates than it does on short—term
real rates follows from the fact that being temporary, such an expansion raises the current price level P,
while leaving all future price expectations unchanged. This reduces the current expected rate of inflation
(P4 —Ps),thereby lowering the short—term nominal rate relative to the short—term real rate. The fall in
the former is therefore greater. if speculators are risk neutral, these effects on the short—term rates translate
11proportionately to corresponding effects on the long—term rates. But with risk averse behavior, the response
of the long—term nominal rate involves a greater dampening of the response of the short—term nominal rate,
than is the case with the corresponding real rate. It is therefore possible for the fall in the long—term real rate
to exceed that of the long—term nominal rate, as noted." An unanticipated permanent monetary expansion,
on the other hand, has a greater effect on the short—term real rate, than it does on the short—term nominal
rate. This is due to the fact that being permanent, it raises the expected future price more than it does
the current price level, thereby increasing the expected rate of inflation (P411 —P1).'2This reduces the fall
in the nominal rate, relative to that of the real rate. These effects are transmitted, via the term structure
relationship., to the long—term rates, this being true irrespective of the degree of risk aversion.
The comparison between the effects of temporary and permanent monetary expansions on the real and
nominal interest rates is also of interest. Hardly surprisingly, a temporary monetary expansion lowers the
short—term nominal interest rate. While one effect of a permanent monetary expansion is to do the same, at
the same time, it will raise expected future inflation rates, thereby putting upward pressure on long— term
nominal rates. From the term structure relationship the fall in the short—term rate is mitigated; i.e., the
short— term nominal rate falls less than if the monetary expansion were only transitory. Consider now real
rates. A temporary monetary expansion reduces the short—term real rate, although by a lesser amount than
the nominal rate, as we have seen. In addition to this effect, an unexpected permanent monetary increase
leads to an upward revision in the prediction of future prices, which causes the current price level to increase
unexpectedly, leading to an increase in the current level of output through the supply function. This in
turn adds to the fall in the long term real rate, required to maintain product market equilibrium, and by
arbitrage, the fall in the short—term real rate is increased.
B. Anticipated Monetary Dütysrôances
The effects of anticipated current monetary changes operate through their impacts on the anticipated
components of the interest rates. Since anticipated real interest rates have been shown to depend only upon
fiscal policy, R,1_11r,,, are independent of any monetary disturbances. It therefore follows that the actual
real rates 1?4, r1, respond equally to anticipated or unanticipated monetary disturbances of a given type.
Also, since an expected permanent increase in the money supply leads to a proportionate expected increase
in the price level, the expected real money stock for each future period is unchanged, so that the effect on
all future expected nominal interest rates, are zero. Furthermore, since the current expected future
long—term nominal rate is just a discounted sum of all expected future short—term rates, all of which are
unaffected by an expected permanent monetary expansion, it too is unchanged. On the other hand, an
12expected temporary increase inthe moneysupply,lowerstheexpected short—term rate i1 so that the
current actual short—termratefails by morethan iftheexpansionwereunanticipated. The same pattern
appliesto the long—termnominalrate,although the responsesare dampened in accordance with the term
structure relationship.
5.IMPACT OF FISCAL DISTURBANCES ON TERM STRUCTURE
We turn now to Part B of Table 2 and consider the effectsofunit increases in real government expenditure
onthe termstructure.
A. Unanticipated Fiscal Disturbances
From Part B of Table 2, the following propositions can be derived:
1. An unanticipated temporary increase in government expenditure wifl raisetheshort —term and long—term
real interest rates, with the effects on the former being proportionately greater by the factor (1 + i/q).
2. An unanticipated temporary increase in government expenditure will raise both the short—term and
long—term nominal interest rates with the effects on the former being proportionately greater by the
factor (.1 + i/k).
3. Assuming the interest elasticity of the demand for money aq c1,an unanticipated permanent increase
in government expenditure raises the long—tenn realrate, doing so by an amount which exceeds its effects
on the short—tenn real rate. In fact, the response of the short—term rate is ambiguous, and under quite
plausible conditions it may well fail.
4. An unanticipated permanent increase in government expenditure raises both the long—term and short—
term nominal rates, with its effect on the former being greater.
5. An unanticipated temporary increase in government expenditure has a greatereffect on real than it does
on nominal rates (both tong-term and short-term). An unanticipated pennanent increase in government
expenditure has a greater effect on nominal rates than it does on real rates (both long—term and short—
term).
6. Provided a2vj < 1, an unanticipated temporary increase in government expenditure has a gsnterefect on
short-lenn rates (both real and nominal) than it does a pennanent increase. An unanticipated permanent
increase has a greater effect on long—term rates (both real and nominal) than does a temporary increase.
The proportionality of the short-term and long-term rates described in 1 and 2 follows immediately
from the term structure relationship and the fact that transitory fiscal disturbances have no expectational
13effects beyond the current period. The results contained in 3 and 4, namely that permanent increases in
government expenditure willhave greatereffects on long—term rates than on short—term rates, we consider
to be the most significant propositions. in the first place, the notion that government expenditure is set as
a stochastic adjustment from the previous period's level, does not seem to be unreasonable. The finding
that this leads to a larger response in long—term rates, relative to short—term rates, means that to the extent
that fluctuations in interest rates are in fact generated by fiscal disturbances of this kind, the variation of
long—term rates relative to that of short—term rates will in fact be much larger than the simple expectations
theory suggests and also much more consistent with the empirical evidence. And this is true even under the
assumption of risk neutrality.
The basic reason for this finding can be seen by comparing the response of the cunent short—term rg
and the expected future short—term rates r+.Fromequation (ha) in Table 1, a permanent increase in
government expenditure raises the current short—term real rate by an amount13
1 2
dr,=[(1+02+017) — _.Z(1÷
whileit raises all expected future short—term real rates by
=> dr.
Comparing these two expressions, a permanent fiscal expansion is seen to have a greater effect on expected
future short—term rates than on the present rate, thereby causing a greater adjustment in the current long—
term rate. The same general argument applies to nominal rates.
A more intuitive explanation is the following. A temporary increase in government expenditure say,
shifts out the IS curve, thereby raising the current long term rate. if it is expected to be permanent, in
addition to having this effect, it will also raise the expected long—term real rates for all subsequent periods.
Since in the short run, some of the variation originating with C. is borne by output, it follows from the IS
curve (la) that the rise in the current long—term rate R is less than 1/d. On the other hand, since output
in all future periods is expected to remain fixed, the effects of expected future increases in government
expenditure are expected to be borne fully by corresponding rises in expected. future long—term rates, the
amount of the expected adjustment being l/d. Since future long—term rats are therefore expected to rise
more than the current, the present price of long—term bonds is expected to fall, and by arbitrage, the short—
term real interest rate rises less than the long rate. In fact, if the expected fail in the price of long—term
real bonds is sufficient, it is possible for the current short—term real rate to actually decline. Much the same
type of argument can be given with respect to nominal rates.
14Turning to the comparison of nominal and real rates given in 5, as noted, an unanticipated transitory
fiscal expansion shifts the IS curve out, thereby increasing both the long—term and short—term real rates. At
the same time, the current price level is raised, although since the disturbance is transitory there is no effect
on the expected price level in any future period. The current expected inflation rate therefore falls and the
short—term nominal rate therefore rises less than the real. By contrast, an unanticipated permanent fiscal
expansion will raise expected future prices more than it does the present. The current expected inflation
rate therefore rises and the nominal rate rises more than the real.
Finally, we turn to the comparison of the effects of temporary and permanent fiscal expansions. In
addition to raising the current long—term real rate, a permanent fiscal expansion will raise both expected
future long—term and short—term real rates by amounts which exceed the adjustment in the current long—
term real rate. This causes the current long—term real rate to adjust more than if the expansion were merely
temporary. On the other hand, a temporary fiscal expansion leaves next period's forecast of the long—term
real rate unchanged; —R,therefore falls. This fall, ss compared to the rise when the increase is
permanent, means that the short—term real rate is more responsive to temporary than to permanent fiscal
expansions.
B. Anticipated Disturbances
An anticipated current fiscal expansion, which is expected to be permanent, raises all current expected
rates (real and nominal, long—term and short—term) by the same amounts, 1/4. Since the long—term expected
real rate depends upon government expenditure for only that period (see (4b)), its response is the same
whether the disturbance is in fact temporary or permanent. The short—term expected real rate in response
to an anticipated transitory shock rises by an amount augmented by the factor (1 + 1/q). The expected
increase in the current short—term nominal rate depends upon the response in the expected price level (see
(13)). The response of the latter to a temporary fiscal expansion exceeds that in response to an expected
permanent expansion if and only if °2qC 1.Finally, the effects of anticipated cunent disturbances on actual
current variables can be obtained by combining these effects with those discussed in 7.
6. RELATWE VARIANCES OF SHORT- AND LONG-TERM RATES
The results summarized in Thble 2 and discussed in Sections 4 and 5 offer important insights into the
observed relative variances of short—term and bag-term rates. From these results we see that if the under-
lying stochastic disturbances consist of some linear combination of: (i) temporary monetary, (ii) permanent









Inthe case where speculators are risk neutral, ,=and these two expressions coincide. Taking
= .05 as being a reasonable value for the long—term equilibrium interest rate, then these ratic imply
= 4 = .0023; the variance of the long rate is a neglible fraction of that of the short rate. Empirically,
the ratio is much larger than .0023 and this is precisely the excess volatility of long rates. We may note that
risk averse speculators raise the ratio 4forreal rates, and in the limiting case when k— 00, thisratio
approaches unity.
By contrast, if the only disturbances are permanent fiscal disturbances, the relationship bewtween the
variances of the short—term and long—term rates is more complicated. In the case of real rates it becomes
4 1+n2+al7+'°"2 (ha
1+a2+aii_4[1+!1
In general, we can show 4 >e,?if and only if
7C272 2[1+a2+Q17———]+-—(i—a2yJ >0 (18)
an inequality which under plausible conthtions will be met. For example, taking the set of parameter values
noted in footnote 13, (IS) is true for all d.Butthis parameter set requires assigning a value to q, which itself
is endogenous, unless k = 0. Sufficient conditions, expressed in terms of basic parameters which ensure that
(18) is met include that each parenthesis be pitive, which too is likely to be met. Otherwise, to obtain a
necessary and sufficient condition for (18) to hold in terms of only basic parameters requires us to solve for
,.Thisinvolves a nonlinear equation and in general is intractable.H




which can be shown to imply el > e if and only if (15) holds, as we have wumed. This latter condition
may be written as
16— doi] + 1 [+ k4(i)Jfl—do1] +1>0 (19)
whichwillclearly be met for all degrees ofrisk aversion, andhencefor all valuesofq, if 1 >do1. ifon the
otherhand, 1 <do1, (19) imposes an upper bound on 4(1). Again to express (19) in terms of the underlying
parameters requires the elimination of q and again the nonlinearity involved makesthisintractable.
But even 11(18) and (19) are not met, it is clear that the relative variances of long to short rates
(bothreal andnominal) are muchlargerwhentheunderlying disturbances arepermanentfiscalshocks.To
the extent that element.s of all such disturbances are occurring simultaneously, our framework is capable of
generating relative variances of long to shortrateswhich are perfectly consistent with empiricalevidence.
7.STRUCTURAL CHANGES AND THE TERM STRUCTURZ
In the policychanges consideredso far, the underlying structure of the economy is assumed to remain
fixed. The consequence of this is that the risk—adjusted discount rate q does not change. We now consider
the effects of changes in: (I) the degree of risk aversion as reflected by k; (ii) an exogenous variance, on the
variances of the short—term and long—term interest rates. We shall restrict our analysis to real rates, but
nominal ratescan be analyzedin asimilar way.
Let us assume that the fluctuations in the economy are due to temporary monetary disturbances, t4"
say,having variance c. From Table2A,the iic.rt—runfluctuationsin the real rates are
7 ,n _—(1+l./tj) & — IC,1—i = —u1 , — r,_1 —
D
withthe corresponding one—period variances being
4(1) =






so that the short—run variance of the long real rate, 4(1), and the risk adjusted discount rate q, are jointly
determinedby(20a), (20c).15 The non—linearity of the former equation raises the possibility of non—existence
and non-uniqueness ofequilibrium,an issue which has been discussed in related contexts by others; see e.g.,
17Driskill and McCafferty (1980),Turnovsky(1983). However, as evident from Fig. 1, such problen do not
arise here.
Fig.I. illustrates the joint determination of 4(1),q, and o(i). The locus XX in the right—hand
side panel is a straight line relating ,jto4(1) in accordance with (20c). The locus YY is the relationship
between 4(1) and q described by the solution (20a). This is an upward sloping curve, passing through the
origin, having the indicated curvature and asymptote. The unique point of intersection A is the equilibrium
solution for q and the short—run real variance 4(1). In the left—hand panel, the curve ZZ relates the
one—period variance of the short—run real rate o(l) to q, and this is negatively sloped as indicated by (2Db),
Corresponding to the equilibrium value of q obtained from the point of intersection A, is the point B in the
ZZ locus,whichin turn yields the equilibrium value for the short—run variance of the short—term real rate
Consider nowanincrease in the degree of risk aversion w as reflected byanincrease in k. This is
illustratedby a rotationofthe XX lineto XX'. The equilibria shiftfromA to A',B to B' respectively,
resultingin anincrease in the one—period variance ofthelong—term rate 4(1),and adecrease in the one—
periodvariance of the short—term rate u(1). This suggests that the assumption of risk neutrality (when the
line XX becomes horizontal) overstates the variance of the short—term rate, relative to that of the long—term
rate.
The movement from A to A' can be decompceed into several components. First, the direct effect of the
increase in cu, for given variance 4(1), is to raise 'i• This is represented by the move from A to C. This rise
in q in turn leads to an increase in 4(1) (see (20a)] and this is illustrated by the move from C to D. This
induced rise in 4(1) then increases q further, which in turn increases 4(1), etc., and this is illustrated by
the move along the locus VA'. The mirror images of these adjustments in the left—hand panel are given by
a jumpfromB to E, followed by a gradual adjustment along RB'.
Fig. 1.Billustratesan increase in the variance of the transitorymoneyshock, e. In this case XX
remains unchanged; YY rotates outwards,whileZZ shifts outwards. The result is that theequilibrium
points A, B shift to A' and B' respectively. The variance of the long-term rate definitely increases, while
the variance of the short—term rate may either increase as illnstrated, or decrease. The move can be broken
down into two effects. The first are the direct increases due to the outward shifts in the XX and ZZ curves
and are givenbythe movements AC, BD.Theseeffects assumr.that remains constant. But as the variance
of the tong-term rate increases, 4(1) the discount rate ,inaeases.This tends to raise the long-term real
rate, while lowering the short-term rate. These moves, illustated by the movements CA', DB', reinforce
the direct effect in the former case, but counteract it in the latter.
18The analysis for permanent monetary shocks and temporary fiscal disturbancesis essentialjy identical
to that given. The case of permanent fiscal disturbances is however, different, and isillustrated in Figure 2.
Spacelimitationspermitonly a brief discussion of thiscase.
The lines XX, YY, and ZZ are analogous to those in Fig. 1. The relationship betweenoj(l) and ,
isnow negatively sloped, while that between u(1) and 'i changes sign with q. As before, there isa unique
equilibrium. Since in the limit as v— oo,4(1)=c(l),we see from the figure that 4(1)> e(1) at least
as long as q is sufficiently large so that c,?(1) ties to the right of the vertical through Q (note QO =OR).An
increase in the degree of risk aversion now lowers the variance of the long rate andmay or may not increase
the short variance, depending upon q. The direct effect of an increase in the variance of thepermanent fiscal
shock is to raise the variances of both the long—term and short—term rates by amounts AC, BDrespectively.
But the accompanying increase in q leads to a partially offsetting reduction in 4(1), illustrated by CA'.
The induced effect on e(1) is measured by DB', which as illustrated represents a further rise, but which
may be a decline if q is sufficiently small.
8. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analyzed the term structure of interest rates within a complete stochastic macroeconomic
model. Two main aspects have been discuss&
First, we have analyzed in some detail the effects of various monetary and fiscal policies on the term
structure. In so doing, we have contrasted the effects of temporary vs. permanent, and unanticipated vs.
anticipated, disturbances on the one hand, and the responses of long vs. short, and real vs. nominal rates,
on the other. The main results are summarized in a series of propositions outlined in Sections 4 and 5. These
underscore the general conclusion that the response of the term structure is highly sensitive to the nature
of the underlying shocks impinging on the econow. Although little purpose would be served by reviewing
these propositions, it is worth highlighting some of the sharp contrasts we have obtained.
For example, whereas an unanticipated temporary monetary expansion tends to have a greater effect
on nominal rates, an unanticipated permanent monetary expansion has a greater effect on real rates. These
relative responses are reversed for fiscal policy. While an unanticipated temporary fiscal expansion has
greater effects on real rates, an unanticipated permanent expansion has a greater impact on nominal rates.
Thirdly, and most importantly, although a temporary fiscal expansion has a greater effect on short rates,
an unanticipated permanent fiscal expansion has greater impact on long term rates. 'lb the extent that
such shifts represent a significant source of the stochastic fluctuations in interest rates, this result may help
significantly in exptaining the observed volatility of long-term rates.
19The secondmajoraspect we have discussed is to show how with risk averse behavior any structural
changehastwo effects on the variances of the interest rain. In addition to &directeffect, there is an indirect
effectwhich operates throughtheimpact of thechangeonprivate speculativebehavior. The latter may
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UFOOTNOTES
The constructive comments of two referees are gratefully acknowledged.
'For example, the Blanchard and Thrnovsky—Miller models are both non—stochastic in whichprices re-
main fixed or at best are introduced in a restrictive way.Bothanalyses lead to saddlepoint—type dynamics,
with the forward—looking behavior of the long rate, being combined with the backward—looking behavior
arising from some sluggishness in the system. In the Blanchard model, this is introduced through gradual
adjustments in output, while in the Thrnovsky—Miller model, it arises through the process of wealth accu-
mulation. The Mascaro and Meltzer paper introduces risk but as a given exogenous parameter. The analysis
is therefore essentially deterministic, as well. The McCafferty paper is closest to the present. It derives the
term structure from underlying mean—variance utility maximization of risk—averse speculators. In his model,
however, prices remain fixed, while the range of exogenous disturbances considered is much less extensive.
Finally, Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) present the most general stochastic utility maximizing approach to
the term structure. However, their analysis does not address macroeconomic policy issues, which are the
primefocus of the present analysis.
2Some ofthe well—knownearly workincludesModiglianiand Sutch (1966), Modigliani andShiller(1972),
while among the morerecent contributions are Shiller(1979),Mankiw and Miron (1985),Mankiw (1986).
3Other justificationsforthe inclusionofthe long—termrate is thatto the extentthatreal private
expenditure include investmentgoods,itdependsupon Tobin's q, which inturnisinversely relatedtothe
long—term realrate. Also, thelong—term realrate reflectsasset valuesand their impact throughwealthon
current consumption. But, it is also possible for consumption to depend upon the short—term real rate as
well. The inclusion of this variable, in addition to R, does not alter the substance of our analysis in any way.
4This specification assumes risk neutrality, if more generally, one assumes a mean—variance utility
maximizing framework, then under somewhat restrictive conditions this relationship can be amended to
simply include a risk premium, which is a function of the underlying one—period variance of the price level.
While this constant may be treated as fixed for any given probability distribution, it does of course change
as the price variance changes across distributions. This aspect is discussed further in a expanded version of
this paper.




wherert.fl denotes profits, and w measures thedegreeofrisk aversion.Thenone canshowthat thiswillgive rise to the following linearized speculative demand function for long bonds, L.
L'— r________ I we(1)L It
Suppose, in addition there axe non-speculators, whose demand function for long bonds depends upon the
interest differential
Lr=p(Ri—r)fl>0.
Equilibrium in the bond market, L' + L;' =0implies
A5 ____ [ft +
—ri) — w4(1)01.t — &) = 0
and this may be solved for r,inthe form
=— 4c+1.1 — R1)
where
a ) + fiw4(1)/E2 aA+ k4(1).
This procedure is eentially the stock analogue to the flow formulation adopted by McCafferty (1986). It is
discussed further in an expanded version of this paper.
5Throughout we shall adopt the following notation. For any variable X say, x;+,,denotesthe prediction
of X for time t + j,formedat time 1.
'By considering the stable solution, we are ruling out speculative bubbles.
8The analysis is based on the assumption that private agents can distinguish between permanent and
transitory shocks. This is clearly restrictive. More generally, agents will be faced with trying to infer the
permanent and transitory components from observations on the current and past policy variablesthemselves.
For an example of this using the optimal linear forecasting methods of Muth (1960) see Brunner, Cukierman
and Meltzer (1980). Our separate treatment of permanent and transitory disturbances corresponds to two
polar cases of this more general approach.
9For example, taking the risk adjusted discount rate to be say .10. the income elasticity of the demand
for money a1 to be 1, (15) is met as long as d < 11, which is surely the case for any plausibly sloped IS
curve.'°The formal condition ior the effect on the long—term nominal rate to bepester is d> fl(1/')— 1/A).
This is certainly met under risk neutrality (when q = k), but need not hold otherwise.
"For example, taking values ofi =.1O,k=.05,y=1,the fall in the long—term real rate exceeds that
of the tong—term nominal rate provided d C10,which seems reasonable.
12The response of the expected inflation rate can be determined by combiningequations (6'), (9) and
(12).
'3Taking values of a1 =1,a3=.5,y=1,q=.10as being plausible the short—term real rate will rise or
fall depending upon whether d 1.1. While a rise would seem more likely, a fall definitely cannot be ruled
out.
'4The nonlinearity involved is illustrated for temporary monetary shocks by equations (20a), (20c)
below.
'5The role of the endogeneity of speculative behavior in the determination of the term structure is also
discussed by MeCafferty (1986).
'6Note that since both cj(1),c(1) converge to 1/d as q —.oc,the distance QY =QR.Figure 1
illustrates how for these disturbances o(1) >4(1).
"This is based on the plausible assumption made earlier that R responds positively to a permanent
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